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The British economy continues to be buffeted by a range of forces, some of them the direct 
result of government policy. However, there is scope for learning from past policy 
mistakes. In other words it does not have to be like this, but to learn from mistakes requires 
rethinking how the economy is analysed. Here we raise questions about the way fiscal and 
monetary policy have been understood by government and propose a different analysis. 
 
This alternative analysis suggests that the dominant problem for the UK continues to be a 
lack of demand which translates into discouragement from investing enough in productive 
capacity for the future and also from employing enough additional workers. This argument 
is based on Keynes’s principle of effective demand, which has been pushed aside in recent 
decades by policy aimed instead at improving the capacity to supply. It is good to promote 
increased productivity, but supply capacity is no use if there is inadequate demand, and 
indeed inadequate demand discourages efforts to expand supply capacity.  
 
The banking crisis was an international phenomenon. However, earlier UK policy on 
financial deregulation and the focusing of central bank action on an inflation target were 
major contributors to the UK experience. Crisis was not inevitable. Not all banking systems 
succumbed to the crisis; Canada and Australia are examples of banking systems which had 
retained enough regulatory control to ensure that they emerged relatively unscathed. While 
the past cannot be undone, lessons can be learned for policy now to address the fallout of 
the banking crisis and the resulting economic crisis. The continuing policy of fiscal 
austerity is also one from which lessons can be learned. 
 
What can be learned in particular is the way in which financial markets in general, and 
banks in particular, work and how they interrelate with the real economy of production and 
employment. The policy of fiscal austerity was introduced in the UK partly to appease the 
financial markets, which were expected by the government to devalue public debt because 
of the rising fiscal deficit (as happened in Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal). Rather than 
challenging this market view, the government validated it.  
 
Consumer spending and the housing market have eventually started to rebound in spite of 
austerity. Contributory factors have included the uneven burden of austerity policies, which 
have had the greatest impact at the lower end of the income scale, but also some 
expansionary measures, like the Help to Buy scheme, which contradicted the austerity 
rhetoric. But continued weak business investment shows the low confidence in this 
rebound, and thus in sustained employment prospects. Without austerity policies the 
economy would have rebounded more strongly and earlier, which itself would have 
improved the budgetary situation. As aggregate demand rises due to expansionary fiscal 
policy, revenues also rise and expenditures on benefits fall. An examination of history 
would suggest that the best way to cure a deficit is to promote economic growth, so 
stimulus rather than austerity is called for.  
 
The worsening fiscal situation had been the result of the banking crisis and its effect on 
demand. Falling asset values (and thus wealth) combined with a high level of uncertainty 
about the future discouraged spending by firms and households. Past deregulation of the 
banking system had allowed banks to divert attention from their traditional functions of 
providing a safe, reliable basis for holding money and making payments on the one hand 
and providing credit to finance investment in productive capacity on the other. Because of 
the crisis, there was now uncertainty among the public about the safety of bank deposits 
and among the banks about the viability of new loans. 
 
The current policy focus on banks is intended to address both issues. New regulation is 
being designed to make high street banks safer by limiting the activities they can be 
involved in. This policy recognises that the crisis arose from allowing high street banks to 
become involved in excessively risky activities, with the Bank of England effectively 
required to provide backup which proved to be very costly and also seemed to condone the 
risky activities. Banks are also to be required to hold more capital. However, it is not clear 
whether lack of capital as such was a critical factor in the crisis, as opposed to the impetus 
given to the massive growth in markets in structured products by the banks’ attempts to 
avoid the existing capital requirements. 
 
Banks are also being encouraged to increase loans. Reducing official interest rates did not 
work, so various programmes have been tried to encourage a significant increase in direct 
lending. Otherwise the main plank of monetary policy has been quantitative easing. This 
includes the Bank of England buying some corporate bonds, but overwhelmingly the policy 
has consisted of the Bank buying government bonds from the market. Since 1997, the Bank 
of England has not been allowed to lend directly to the government or to issue government 
bonds. So quantitative easing is in effect using the old measure of open market operations 
to finance the fiscal deficit, but indirectly, with bond traders pocketing a turn on purchases 
and sales. A shift in fiscal policy away from austerity could similarly be financed by the 
Bank of England until growth started reducing the deficit.  
 
In any case, much of the public discussion of quantitative easing has been based on a 
misunderstanding of the banking system, which the Bank of England has recently 
attempted to correct. It has been widely believed that the banks are waiting for an increase 
in their reserves (from bonds being bought with ‘new money’ from the Bank of England) 
before they can increase lending. However, it is a very long time since banks have been 
held back from lending by a shortage of reserves. The way in which the Bank of England 
makes sure that the money market interest rate keeps to the official rate is to lend in the 
interbank market when rates threaten to rise and borrow when they threaten to fall. The 
money supply rises as the banks make loans by adding to the borrowers’ accounts. Only 
then do the banks look for new reserves. If there is not enough liquidity for them in the 
market, the Bank supplies it to stop interest rates rising. However, if the banks do not wish 
to lend, they do not. Instead, like firms and households, they build up liquidity as best they 
can to protect themselves from being exposed to high risk in a continuing uncertain 
environment. There may be more reserves in the system, but the money supply does not 
necessarily rise. 
 
The economy is now growing again, but later and more tentatively than if austerity had not 
been pursued. What has been argued here is that the primary issue is a lack of demand 
which worsens the fiscal situation and discourages firms from investing and banks from 
lending. It has been argued here that this should be addressed by a reversal of the fiscal 
austerity policy, financed effectively by the Bank of England. This reversal could range 
from shovel-ready capital projects to reversing cuts in benefits to vulnerable members of 
society and to support for charities already providing social services. This would encourage 
growth, encouraging firms to invest and banks to lend, while reversing the growth in 
disparities between the different groups in society.  
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